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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to construct and apply a model for the allocation of water 
between two competing users, namely irrigation and hydropower. The model is applied 
in a case study of a specific water system located in North Eastern Spain. Starting with 
an irrigation-hydropower joint income function, we develop a constrained maximisation 
process that takes into account the environmental, institutional and actual priority of the 
water rights. The resulting solution can be useful as a guide for potential bargains 
between users. Furthermore, we evaluate the results for different supply (precipitation) 
and water allotments (increase in irrigated land). The results show that there are 
sufficient incentives so as to reach agreements that lead to improvements in a Pareto 
sense without side payments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The problems faced by the management of water in countries where the 
Mediterranean climate prevails are well known, given the uncertainty to which the 
supply of this resource is subject both in terms of space and over time. In order to 
guarantee that users can rely on the necessary amounts of surface water, certain 
volumes and priorities are assigned to the different uses under the terms of the so-called 
water rights, with these representing the main legal instrument that ranks and allocates 
the uses in space and over time. 
The two most important elements that define the water right from the point of view 
of the short-term management of the resource are the volume and the guarantee. 
Although these are, in principle, two different aspects -the volume of needs as against 
the security level-  they have traditionally been considered as one and the same 
problem, in such a way that the level of use granted in the water right is over and above 
that which is strictly necessary. The deliberate over-scaling of civil engineering projects 
for the regulation of water (generally financed by way of public funds) have frequently 
been used in order to guarantee that the true needs are satisfied even in dry years. 
Against this background, the literature and, to a lesser extent, empirical practice has 
considered the possibility of water rights transactions under a formula that is more or 
less the same as that which would operate in a free market of such rights. As Sumpsi et 
al. (1998) indicate, these mechanisms are cheaper and, above all, more flexible 
strategies than water regulation projects, in that the associated environmental costs are 
lower or, at the very least, would not generate situations of irreversibility. Illustrations 
of this approach can also be found in Garrido (1994) and the now classic texts of Young 
and Haveman (1985) and Gibbons (1986). On the adequacy of specific situations to 
market models and the problems this entails, see Colby et al. (1993) or Griffin and Hsu 
(1993) amongst others.. 
However, and as Winpenny (1994) confirms, the heart of the process for the 
allocation of large volumes of water continues to be governed by a body of 
administrative regulations, with the free exchange of water rights being exceptional. 
Thus, the search for allocation schemes that are closer to the market and in a basic 
context of the public ownership and distribution of the water resource remains a fruitful 
field of research. An example of this at the international level can be found in the work 
of Dinar and Wolf (1994). Two basic aspects that must be reflected in such allocation 
schemes are the order of priority of the water rights established by law and, as already 
mentioned, the uncertainty to which the supply of water is subject in the Mediterranean 
lands, and particular attention is given to these in what follows.  
The central problem that we address is the conflict between different users of the 
water resource. This conflict arises from either restrictions in the supply or increases in 
the requirement as a result, for example, of a decline in precipitation or of greater water 
requirements to irrigate new areas. In this paper, such a problem and the possibilities of 
its resolution are considered in a very habitual case, namely competition between 
irrigation and hydropower for the use of water stored in a reservoir. The technical 
antecedents for such a situation can be found in Butcher and Wandschneider (1986) and 
Houston and Whittesey (1986). Similarly, we can cite antecedents that are 
geographically close to our case study, as reflected in the so-called "Pacto de Piñana" 
(Piñana Agreement), where the right to freely turbine the waters of the Santa Ana 
reservoir, lying on the river Noguera Ribagorzana, whose water rights were previously 
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owned by the hydropower companies, where negotiated away in exchange for a 
significant monetary compensation (see Bielsa, 1999). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the 
theoretical model to represent this type of problem. This model includes the 
specification of the two users in the behaviour functions and, as its most novel aspect, 
the formal representation of the priority in the uses resulting from the application of the 
legal regulations through the constraints of the problem. On the basis of a constrained 
maximisation model, we consider bargaining between the parties in order to reach, if 
possible, a greater overall profit in a cooperative agreement. Section 3 is devoted to an 
empirical application of the model through the simulation of various scenarios and 
Section 4 closes the paper with a review of the main results.  
 
 
2. The Model 
 
A first theoretical principle in any analysis of this water problem undertaken from 
the point of view of economic theory is that users will exchange units of resource up to 
the point when the value of the marginal productivity of the last units of water 
incorporated coincides in each one of these users (the principle of equimarginality). In 
the particular case of water, to achieve this optimum situation, particular account must 
be taken of the institutional framework in which the users’ decisions are taken (order of 
priority of the uses established by law and volume assigned that defines its water right). 
Thus, on the basis of an inefficient allocation, and to the extent that the institutional 
framework permits, the exchange of rights should lead us, if not to a theoretical 
equilibrium, then at least to a better situation in the Pareto sense. To guarantee the move 
to a new distribution of resources, side payments will occasionally be necessary in 
favour of the parties that assign their rights. This consideration will be equal to the 
difference between their level of profits before and after the transaction, according to 
the Kaldor-Hicks principle of compensation. 
Resting on this well known theoretical framework, the model we propose describes 
the joint profit function of the two agents (irrigation and hydropower). It also reflects 
the system of water flows that result from the interaction between four types of use with 
different water rights regimes in a territory that counts on a river channel and a reservoir 
that mitigates markedly seasonal nature of the precipitation. The uses are linked one 
with the other both by their geographical situation and by the order of priorities 
established by law. The geographical structure that determines the relationship between 
the uses appears in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 
t= 1 t= 2
A1 A2
R1 R2
U11 C41 U21 U12 C42 U32
 C21+ C22+
C21 C22
C11 C31 C12 C32
Reservoir
Town Irrigation
 
We divide the water year into the non-irrigation (t = 1) and irrigation (t = 2) periods 
and we have four water users: urban (U1), the minimum streamflow or compensation 
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flow (U2), irrigation (U3) and hydropower (U4). The levels of water rights and 
effective use are Ckt, Ukt for k = 1,2,3,4, types of use. The reservoir that supplies them 
has certain minimum levels to guarantee drinking water, which we denote by R0. 
The term t, that can be positive or negative, represents the possible 
surpluses/deficits that arise with respect to the minimum streamflow C4t. The stock 
variables of the model are Vt and Rt. Vt represents the volume of water available in 
each system and corresponds to the initial reserves of that system (Rt-1) plus the 
streamflows it receives in the form of upstream flows of the river (At). The variable Rjt 
takes values between 0 and the maximum capacity of the reservoir (Rmax). 
Furthermore, in function of what is the amount of streamflows and the intensity of 
the uses, the volume of reservoir reserves will take values above or below the security 
reservoir reserve R0. Thus, if the available water is insufficient even for urban uses, the 
reserve will be null until such uses are satisfied and, from that moment on, will have 
priority over any other use until the said security level is reached (Rt = R0). Once this 
limit has been exceeded, additional units of water will only be stored in the reservoir if 
all other uses have been satisfied. 
The irrigation-based farmers cultivate a mixture of i different products (i = 1,2,...,n) 
with profits per unit of surface area (also discounting the cost of water. Note that the 
margin used corresponds to the profit per hectare; that is to say, to the net margin less 
other indirect costs as these are defined in the agricultural accounting documents, for 
example, MOPTMA (1993).) of mAi, surface areas given over to cultivation of  si and 
water use for each crop and period of U3it (which, in turn, depends on the water 
requirements of the crop, WRi and the irrigation efficiency, e). 
As regards hydropower, the profit also depends on its profit per unit of energy 
produced (mH), on the turbined streamflow (U4t), on the feet of head of water in the 
reservoir (h)  -which, in turn, depends on the volume of water stored in the reservoir h = 
h (Rt)-  and on a conversion constant of these factors in energy that we note as   . The 
margin mH corresponds to the profit obtained by the last unit of energy (Kwh) produced. 
On the basis of this general scheme, we propose an optimum allocation model 
between uses with the following objective joint profit function and constraints: 
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The constraints reflect three essential aspects. First, the order of priority of the water 
rights. Secondly, the relation between uses (rival and successive, that is to say, that 
compete for the same unit of water or that use the water successively). Thirdly, the fact 
that the water right is the maximum level of water that can be used by each agent. 
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As regards the order of priority, this has been established in legal form in the 
following terms. First, urban requirements of the two systems (in the case of extreme 
scarcity, priority will be given to the use that is closest to the upper stretches of the 
river) and the security reservoir reserves. Second, the minimum streamflow (U2t), third, 
irrigation requirements (U3t) and fourth, the hydropower requirements (U4t). This 
explains the succession of nested constraints according to the order of priority. 
Turning to the second of these aspects, the relation between uses, the hydroelectric 
plant uses and the minimum streamflow are successive because the turbining is carried 
out at the foot of the reservoir. However, the urban and the irrigation water uses of each 
system are rivals one with the other and with respect to the other uses, that is to say, the 
water diverted for these purposes is not available in the river channel (save that which 
subsequently comes back to it via return flows). Thus, if we calculate the total 
requirement of two rival uses, we will do so by totalling them and, if they are 
successive, by selecting the larger of them. Finally, no user can exceed the volume of 
water granted or bargained under the terms of its water right, which justifies the 
minimum option in the constraints of the uses and of the levels of reserves. 
As a consequence of the above, if there is a balance between the median 
streamflows and the water required for the systems of uses, then the six constraints will 
allow us to see how the water is assigned to each type of use, thereby characterising a 
steady equilibrium between resources and requirements. 
Having established the theoretical framework, we will now carry out a comparative 
static exercise on the basis of a specific case comprised of the following steps. First, we 
assume a reduction in the streamflows (dry years) that leads to a conflict between uses. 
We then consider and solve the constraint maximisation problem for these new values 
of the exogenous variables. Finally, we evaluate and compare the two situations, that is 
to say, that which results from the strict application of the order of priorities and that 
obtained from the joint profit optimisation exercise, in relation to the conflict as initially 
posed. 
 
3. Empirical Application 
 
To illustrate the essential aspects of the proposed model, in this Section we will 
apply it to an analysis on the rival requirements for the water stored in the Vadiello 
reservoir, which lies in the province of Huesca in North Eastern Spain. This area is 
characterised by its well delimited urban (the city of Huesca) and irrigation (1400 Ha. 
of irrigated land) requirements, as well as by the minimum streamflow (of an amount 
similar to that for urban use) and the possible need for water by a hypothetical 
hydroelectric plant. We have also defined a security reservoir reserve for urban use of 5 
Hm3 from a reservoir that has a capacity of 16 Hm3. 
Table 1 represents a situation that we might describe as steady equilibrium for a 
given regime of streamflows (that of the Vadiello reservoir in an average water year). 
As we can see, all the water rights are satisfied, that is to say, there is no deficit for 
any sector. The net requirement shows the volume of water withdrawn from the 
reservoir to meet the uses. Given that the value of turbined water depends on the feet of 
head of water held in the reservoir at any moment (and, therefore, on the volume of 
reserves), each one of the periods is associated with a value of energy per unit of water 
used, which in this case is of 0.32 pesetas/m3 in the two periods. 
Table 1 
 T1 T2  T1 T2 
 5
Streamflow 20 12 Net Demand 12 20 
Available 25 27 Initial Reserves 5 13 
C1 10 10 Final Reserves 13 5 
C2 0 12 Deficit   
C3 4 4 1 Úrban 0 0 
C4 4 4 2 Min Stflow -4 0 
U1 10 10 3Irrigation 0 0 
U2 0 12 4 Hydropower 0 0 
U3 4 4 Security reserve. 0 0 
U4 4 4 H’power profit  0.32 0.32 
 
3.1 A study of the possible strategies and scenarios 
 
Starting from a situation of equilibrium such as that described earlier, we can pose 
two types of problem that can arise as a result of changes in the conditions of supply 
and/or requirement. The first is of drought, where we suppose a fall in streamflows of 
30%, whilst the second involves an increase in the surface area given over to irrigation 
of 500 new hectares. 
We reduce both problems to the following terms: calculate the changes in the 
turbining programme that are necessary in order to maximise the joint irrigation-
hydropower profit. The resolution of this problem determines certain levels of water 
stored in the reservoir (Rt) in the first period (immediately prior to the beginning of the 
irrigation season) and certain changes in the profits of both uses in the face of this new 
situation. In the circumstances where losses are suffered in the hydropower sector with 
respect to the initial situation, it will be necessary to evaluate them and to establish 
some bargaining system that guarantees that this new equilibrium is achieved and 
accepted by both parties. 
In order to make the theoretical model operative, we make the profit function take a 
specific form in such a way that mH is a standard value of the electric energy of 8 
pesetas/Kwh (updated value of the margin for hydropower production that appears in 
MOPTMA (1993)) the feet of head is estimated by way of a function h =  ln(R’)  
(where R’ represents the average reservoir reserves between the two periods). The best 
fit to the head of the reservoir and the reserves is obtained through a semi-logarithmic 
function with coefficient 8.2323. The parameter in the maximisation function is the 
flow conversion constant and feet of head in energy with a turbining return of 80% that 
takes the value of 2180 Kwh/Hm3. 
For its part, the 1400 hectares of irrigation that exist in the area are distributed 
between four types of crop: cereals (55%), industrial crops (29%), vegetables (15%) 
and fruit (1%). We assume in all cases irrigation efficiency of 47% (see Bielsa, 1999). 
In what follows we will consider both cases and the strategies associated with them. 
 
3.2. Case 1: Strategy in a dry period 
 
Here we will consider the situation that arises in the case of a reduction of 30% in 
the streamflow, that is to say, a “typical” dry year. The streamflows follow a stochastic 
process characterised according to a Normal random variable with known average and 
variance. The typical dry year will be that that leaves "to its left" a reduced percentage 
of the years (for example 2.5%). This means that in no case is it considered that a 
guarantee of 100% is possible; the risk being simply limited to certain levels that are 
lower than in the absence of this stochastic view. Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution 
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of the resources in such a situation, either with the initial water rights being maintained 
(non-cooperative) or when an agreement is reached between the users (optimum or 
cooperative solution). 
The values of all the variables and parameters are reflected in Table 2. This Table is 
divided into three blocks: the initial seasonal situation, the case of a dry year for the 
initial water rights and, finally, the distribution of water rights that results from the 
maximisation of the joint profit. The modified values of the water right and the resultant 
deficits appear in bold type. 
Figure 2 
Non-cooperative situation in a dry year 
 
NON IRRIGAT. PERIOD (t=1) IRRIGATION PERIOD (t=2)
14 8
7 5
4 12 0 4 12 2
8 4
4 4
4 0 4
11.2 7.68
12
  
 
Table 2 
Fall in streamflow of 30% 
 Initial Situation Dry Year (30 %) Cooperative Solution 
 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
Streamflow 20 12 14 8 14 8 
Available 25 25 19 15 19 19 
C1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
C2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
C3 0 12 0 12 0 12 
C4 12 12 12 12 8 13 
U1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
U2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
U3 0 12 0 2 0 6 
U4 12 12 12 10 8 13 
Net Demand 12 20 12 10 8 14 
Initial Reserves 5 13 5 7 5 11 
Final Reserv. (Rt) 13 5 7 5 11 5 
Déficit       
1 Urban 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Min St’flow -4 0 -4 0 0 0 
3 Irrigation 0 0 0 10 0 6 
4 Hydropower 0 0 0 2 4 -1 
Security Reserve 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hydropower profit  0.32 0..32 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.30 
  
Following the order of uses, the deficits appear in the second period of the dry year 
and, for hydropower uses, are the difference between the obligatory release of water 
from the reservoir for the population or the minimum streamflow (the larger of the two) 
and the turbining requirements of that activity. The case of irrigation, which occupies 
third place in the order of priority, is similar: it can count on the water left to it from 
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urban requirements and the security reservoir reserve, with its deficit being made-up of 
its outstanding requirements. 
Figure 3 
Cooperative solution for a dry year 
NON IRRIGAT. PERIOD (t=1) IRIGATION PERIOD (t=2)
14 8
11 5
4 8 0 4 13 6
4 4
4 4
4 0 4
7.2 8.48
12
 
As we can see, the decline in precipitation is translated into a smaller amount of 
water stored in the reservoir that persists throughout the year. Under the optimum 
solution, the hydroelectric firm will change the water right programme in such a way 
that it renounces a part of its initial water right in the first period in exchange for a 
larger one in the second. This exchange further include an increase in the level of water 
stored in the reservoir (and, therefore, a greater head) that is translated into a higher 
profit per unit of water turbined (see Table 2). In this way, irrigation counts on more 
available resources in the dry period, which is the equivalent of a lower impact on the 
part of the dry period in its profit and loss account. Thus, if both parties reach an 
agreement such as that suggested by the optimum solution, an improvement will be 
achieved in the Pareto sense with respect to the case in which there is no agreement. 
This can be appreciated from Table 3, which shows the profits obtained from 
cooperation and compared to non-cooperation. We are dealing with a case of a 
cooperative solution that does not require side payments. 
 
Table 3 
Profits in the dry year case under cooperative and non-cooperative strategies 
 
  PROFITS*   
SECTOR AVERAGE YEAR NON COOPERATIVE COOPERATIVE GAIN 
HYDROPOWER 7.62 5.80 6.25 0.46 
IRRIGATION 52.29 10.46 27.89 17.43 
JOINT 59.91 16.26 34.14 17.89 
* The non-cooperative solution corresponds to the maintenance of the initial water rigths and the 
cooperative to changes in the terms indicated. The figures are expressed in millions of pesetas. 
 
The figures show that it is possible to establish option agreements between 
irrigation-based farmers and hydropower producers in dry years that mitigates the 
irrigation losses without prejudice to the hydropower profits. This represents a type of 
drought insurance for irrigation, given that it is the equivalent to an increase in its 
effective allocation for the amount of water stored in the reservoirs when turbining is 
reduced. 
 
3.3. Case 2. Increase in the irrigated surface area 
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In this case we suppose the existence of a plan under which the surface area being 
irrigated is increased by 500 hectares, without any modification to the distribution of 
crops. In principle, this supposes a permanent deficit of 4 Hm3 for irrigation, given that 
the streamflows of an average year and the current hydropower water rights could not 
cover the additional requirements caused by these newly irrigated areas. 
Here, we cannot speak of a meteorological deficit resulting from a decline in 
precipitation, but rather of an increase in requirements that exceeds the current capacity 
of the Water System to satisfy them. This is what the literature describes as a water 
deficit and, under market conditions; it can be resolved through a relative rise in the 
price of the good, which has become a scarce resource in such conditions. However, 
given the institutional structure described at the beginning of this paper, the 
implementation of such a process cannot be anticipated in Spain, at least in the short 
term. 
The optimisation exercise shows that it is possible to establish agreements, that will 
now be of a permanent character, to improve the situation of both users. The 
environmental consequences of this type of transfer are a factor to be taken into 
account. The substitution of a source of clean energy for other alternatives could lead to 
permanent adverse effects on the level of CO2 or acid rain. Furthermore, these transfers 
could avoid the construction of new reservoirs, with the consequent benefit for the 
water course and the socio-economic environment of the affected areas. This balance is 
not taken into account in this simplified optimisation exercise, that only reflects the 
short-term monetary effects. 
Table 4 
Increase in the irrigated surface area of 500 hectares 
 Initial Situation Non Cooperat. Solution Cooperative Solution 
 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
Streamflow 20 12 20 12 20 12 
Available 25 25 25 25 25 28 
C1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
C2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
C3 0 12 0 16 0 16 
C4 12 12 12 12 9 31 
U1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
U2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
U3 0 12 0 12 0 15 
U4 12 12 12 12 9 23 
Net Demand 12 20 12 20 9 23 
Initial Reserves 5 13 5 13 5 16 
Final Reserves(Rt) 13 5 13 5 16 5 
Deficit       
1 Urban 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Min St’flow -4 0 -4 0 -1 0 
3 Irrigation 0 0 0 4 0 1 
4 Hydropower 0 0 0 0 3 -11 
Security Reserve 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H’power profit  0,32 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,34 0,34 
 
Thus, we are not now faced with two different situations that we can refer to as a 
“normal” or “dry” year, but rather to two possible distributions of the resource over 
time. The following Tables and Figure illustrate the three situations of this comparative 
static analysis. 
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The agreement will take the form of hydropower renouncing 3 Hm3 of its water 
right in the first period in exchange for free turbining in the second. In this way, and 
using the water that has been stored in the reservoir during the non-irrigation period, 
agriculture could have practically all the water that it needs in the irrigation period 
available to it. 
 
Figure 4 
Cooperative solution to the increase of irrigated surface area 
NON IRRIGAT. PERIOD (t=1) IRRIGATION PERIOD (t=2)
20 12
16 5
4 9 0 4 31 15
5 4
4 4
4 0 4
8.2 10.2
16
 
Once again, the cooperative option reveals itself as being superior to the non-
cooperative, given that both users will achieve an increase in their profits. Note that 
hydropower benefits not only from the greater volume of water turbined in the second 
period, but also from an increase in the value per unit of water that it uses, due to the 
increase in the feet of head of water stored in the reservoir. These figures and the profit 
obtained under the two options can be seen in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Profits obtained under the solution to the increase in irrigated surface area 
  PROFITS   
SECTOR STEADY NON COOPERAT. COOPERATIVE GAIN 
HYDROPOWER. 8 7,66 10,87 3,24 
IRRIGATION 52 53 65 14 
JOINT 59 61 76 17 
 
In summary, the results show that in the face of a scarcity of the resource, either as a 
result of meteorological phenomena or of larger water requirements, if the agents 
bargain a distribution of the water rights that is different from the initial situation, then 
such an agreement could achieve not only a mitigation of the losses caused by the 
scarcity (in the first case), but also an improvement in the joint profit of the system. 
This bargaining, according to the case in question, could be translated into permanent 
agreements that would suppose a change in the spatial and temporal distribution of the 
resource. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have considered and proposed a resolution process for a conflict 
that is habitual in the allocation of water within a territory, namely competition between 
users for a resource that is regulated in different periods of time. To that end, we have 
developed a model that integrates the economic and institutional aspects with other 
equally important elements such as the temporal and spatial distribution of the resource.  
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So far as the methodology is concerned, the inclusion of these two latter variables 
supposes an improvement with respect to models that are characterised by considering 
only one period of time and that reflect the spatial aggregation of many users. As an 
additional added value, the form of constructing the model allows us to analyse 
different distributions of the use, which would be extensions or specific cases of the 
original scenario. In this regard a different temporal distribution will give rise to 
different constraints, but a similar logic would be followed in their construction. 
All this notwithstanding, the central objective of this paper has been to characterise 
the possible cooperative agreements between users that guarantee better use of the 
resource. In this sense, the optimisation process that we have proposed sheds light on 
the direction that these possible agreements can take. The specific application carried 
out on the basis of real data for the Vadiello Reservoir (North East Spain) allows us to 
consider an example of how the allocation that maximises the objective function leads 
to a mitigation of the losses in dry periods, and to an increase in the joint profit when 
there is an extension to the surface area under irrigation. 
These simulated situations have two aspects in common. First, the distribution of the 
resources over time is the origin of the conflict; secondly, the decentralised decision of 
the users represents a possible solution to that conflict. 
This same scheme is applicable to situations that are, at first sight, different, but 
which, in their essence, only suppose changes to elements that we have considered as 
given. Thus, the evaluation in terms of profit of the construction of a new dam, the 
incorporation of a new user or the change of the minimum streamflow (for 
environmental reasons) are just three different examples of other possible applications 
of the model. In the first of these, the new dam will provide different distributions of the 
resource, whilst in the second and third there will be new time and space distributions 
for the flows. 
In all these cases, it is necessary to consider the timing in the definition of the water 
right, together with both the quantity and the quality. This latter aspect (the quality) 
represents another of the logical extensions of the model. The main difficulty that such 
incorporation presents is that the water flows are not homogeneous, so that the intake 
and the return flows would not be capable of aggregation. Whilst the model does not 
consider these interesting aspects, we nevertheless believe that an approach of this type 
allows us to make progress in the necessary integration of the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of water within a scheme of an economic type. 
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